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Email to security@opensourcerouting.org

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Vulnerabilities Found and Disclosed

OpenSourceRouting main testing tool for vulnerabilities is a MU8000 by MU Dynamics. See Resilience Testing Summary for details. OpenSourceRouting likes to thank MU Dynamics for their sponsorship.

March 23: VU#551715 Quagga contains multiple vulnerabilities

US-CERT page for summary: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/551715

This disclosure contains 3 issues:

CVE-2012-0249Error in OSPF parsing LS-Update messages Can Cause a Crash of Quagga ospfd

The ospfd implementation of OSPF in Quagga allows a remote attacker (on a local network segment with OSPF enabled) to cause a denial of service (daemon aborts due to an assert) with a malformed OSPF LS-Update message.

Program Impacted: Quagga (ospfd)

Description:
OSPFv2 implementation in Quagga version 0.99.20 and before does not perform a proper length check for a received LS-Update OSPF packet. A received packet, which has actually less bytes, than it is declared in its header, causes a buffer overflow, which immediately leads to a crash of OSPF protocol process and subsequent disruption of IPv4 routing.

Like many other OSPF cases, exploiting this vulnerability requires an ability to form an OSPF adjacency with the attacked OSPF router and initiate a database exchange process with it. Usual OSPF security precautions (including MD5 authentication) may lower the risk of such event. Upgrading to a patched version of Quagga is recommended regardless of any other measures taken.

CVE-2012-0250: Error in OSPF parsing Network-LSA messages Can Cause a Crash of Quagga ospfd

The ospfd implementation of OSPF in Quagga allows a remote attacker (on a local network segment with OSPF enabled) to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) with a malformed OSPF Network-LSA message.

Program Impacted: Quagga (ospfd)

Description:
OSPFv2 implementation in Quagga version 0.99.20 and before does not perform a proper length check of the Network-LSA structures contained in an LS-Update OSPF packet. When an otherwise correct LS-Update OSPF packet contains a Network-LSA structure, which has its "Length" header field set to value bigger than the actual number of bytes in the buffer, a buffer overflow happens. This immediately leads to a crash of OSPF protocol process and subsequent disruption of IPv4 routing.

Like many other OSPF cases, exploiting this vulnerability requires an ability to form an OSPF adjacency with the attacked OSPF router and initiate a database exchange process with it. Usual OSPF security precautions (including MD5 authentication) may lower the risk of such event. Upgrading to a patched version of Quagga is recommended regardless of any other measures taken.

CVE-2012-0255: Error in BGP OPEN Message parsing Can Cause a Crash of Quagga bgpd

The bgpd implementation of BGP in Quagga up to (and including) 0.99.20 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon aborts due to an assert) via BGP Open message with an invalid AS4 capability.

Program Impacted: Quagga (bgpd)

Description:
BGP implementation in Quagga version 0.99.20 and before contains an error in processing malformed AS4 capability in the BGP OPEN message which leads to a abort (daemon aborts due to an assert) of the BGP protocol process and subsequent disruption of IP routing. When an OPEN with a malformed AS4 capability message is detected, the code fails to flush the message buffers for the peer. When the peer next connects and sends a message, the code will attempt to parse the stale, half-consumed data in the message buffer as it were a fresh BGP message. This leads to an assert and exit of the BGP daemon in the BGP OPEN message parsing code.

The vulnerability is not restricted to BGP neighbors with 4-byte AS but can only be done from any configured peers (or sources spoofing the IP of a configured peer). The potential exists for this condition to be intentionally triggered, resulting in effective denial of service by crashing the BGPd. Usual BGP security precautions (including BGP MD5 authentication) may lower the risk of such event.

Credit

Thanks to MU Dynamics for their sponsorship of the protocol fuzzer which uncovered these issues, and Denis Ovsienko & Paul Jakma for fixing the issues.

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